Bachelorarbeit aus dem Jahr 2011 im Fachbereich Informatik - Internet, neue Technologien, Note: 1,6, Duale Hochschule Baden-Wuttemberg, Stuttgart, fruher: Berufsakademie Stuttgart, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Cloud Computing ermoglicht ganz neue Wege im Aufbau und Betrieb einer IT-Infrastruktur. Statt hoher Erst-Investitionskosten fur Hardware- oder Softwarelizenzen konnen IT-Leistungen jetzt as-a-Service" bedarfsorientiert zu variablen Kosten bezogen werden. Hierdurch werden Cloud Computing-Losungen insbesondere fur kleine Unternehmen, Startups und sogar Selbststandige attraktiv, die nun auch in den Genuss hochprofessioneller IT-Leistungen kommen konnen. Mit dem Wegfall dieser Fixkostenblocke ermoglicht Public Cloud-Services jungen Unternehmen, das begrenzte Startkapital eher fur ihr eigentliches Kerngeschaft aufzuwenden. Begriffe wie Lean-IT und Lean-Startup beschreiben hierbei eines der Phanomene, die in den letzten Jahren im Startup-Umfeld zu beobachten sind. Web Startups sind zum Beispiel auf hoch-skalierbare Infrastrukturen angewiesen, um den bei Beginn stark schwankenden und schwer vorhersehbaren Besucheransturm zu bewaltigen - denn mit dem globalen Internet kann die kritische Masse an Nachfrage heutzutage wesentlich schneller erreicht werden. Es gibt mittlerweile uber 250 erwahnenswerte Cloud Computing-Anbieter, darunter auch IBM, Amazon, Microsoft und Google. Diese weltweiten IT- und Beratungsunternehmen sind besonders bei grossen Kunden auf internationalen Markten bekannt: Hier handelt es sich um einen Zielmarkt, in dem die Gewinnmargen im IT-Bereich besonders hoch sind. IBM Deutschland warb auf ihrer Webseite: Cloud-Computing wurde als der nachste grosse Trend tituliert. Das Nonplusultra fur Startups. Eine Idee, deren Zeit gekommen ist ... oder deren Durchbruch kurz bevorsteht." Diese Aussage gilt es zu validieren - Was ist der Mehrwert von Cloud Compuinhg fur Startups? Lohnt es sich, trotz der eingangs erwahnten Umstande der IT-Riesen, ein aktives En

This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology.

The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions.

Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts.

Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters.

The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot andcold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain "a priori" might be dubious."